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Admin API Audit Log
Kong Gateway provides a granular logging facility on its Admin API. This allows cluster administrators to keep detailed track of changes made to the cluster configuration throughout its lifetime, aiding in compliance efforts and providing valuable data points during forensic investigations. Generated audit log trails are Workspace and RBAC-aware, providing Kong operators a deep and wide look into changes happening within the cluster.
Getting Started
Audit logging is disabled by default. It is configured via the Kong configuration (e.g. kong.conf
):
audit_log = on # audit logging is enabled
audit_log = off # audit logging is disabled
or via environment variables:
export KONG_AUDIT_LOG=on
export KONG_AUDIT_LOG=off
As with other Kong configurations, changes take effect on kong reload
or kong
restart
.
Request Audits
Generating and Viewing Audit Logs
Audit logging provides granular details of each HTTP request that was handled by
Kong’s Admin API. Audit log data is written to Kong’s back database. As a result,
request audit logs are available via the Admin API (in addition to via direct
database query). For example, consider a query to the Admin API to the /status
endpoint:
vagrant@ubuntu-xenial:/kong$ http :8001/status
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Date: Tue, 13 Nov 2018 17:32:47 GMT
Server: kong/0.34-enterprise-edition
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
X-Kong-Admin-Request-ID: ZuUfPfnxNn7D2OTU6Xi4zCnQkavzMUNM
{
"database": {
"reachable": true
},
"server": {
"connections_accepted": 1,
"connections_active": 1,
"connections_handled": 1,
"connections_reading": 0,
"connections_waiting": 0,
"connections_writing": 1,
"total_requests": 1
}
}
The above interaction with the Admin API generates a correlating entry in the audit log table. Querying the audit log via Admin API returns the details of the interaction above:
http :8001/audit/requests
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Date: Tue, 13 Nov 2018 17:35:24 GMT
Server: kong/0.34-enterprise-edition
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
X-Kong-Admin-Request-ID: VXgMG1Y3rZKbjrzVYlSdLNPw8asVwhET
{
"data": [
{
"client_ip": "127.0.0.1",
"method": "GET",
"path": "/status",
"payload": null,
"request_id": "ZuUfPfnxNn7D2OTU6Xi4zCnQkavzMUNM",
"request_timestamp": 1581617463,
"signature": null,
"status": 200,
"ttl": 2591995,
"workspace": "0da4afe7-44ad-4e81-a953-5d2923ce68ae"
}
],
"total": 1
}
Note the value of the request_id
field. This is tied to the
X-Kong-Admin-Request-ID
response header received in the first transaction.
This allows close association of client requests and audit log records within
the Kong cluster.
Because every audit log entry is made available via Kong’s Admin API, it is possible to transport audit log entries into existing logging warehouses, SIEM solutions, or other remote services for duplication and inspection.
Workspaces and RBAC
Audit log entries are written with an awareness of the requested Workspace, and
the RBAC user (if present). When RBAC is enforced, the RBAC user’s UUID will be
written to the rbac_user_id
field in the audit log entry:
{
"data": [
{
"client_ip": "127.0.0.1",
"method": "GET",
"path": "/status",
"payload": null,
"rbac_user_id": "2e959b45-0053-41cc-9c2c-5458d0964331",
"request_id": "QUtUa3RMbRLxomqcL68ilOjjl68h56xr",
"request_timestamp": 1581617463,
"signature": null,
"status": 200,
"ttl": 2591995,
"workspace": "0da4afe7-44ad-4e81-a953-5d2923ce68ae"
}
],
"total": 1
}
Note also the presence of the workspace
field. This is the UUID of the Workspace with which the request was associated.
Limiting Audit Log Generation
It may be desirable to ignore audit log generation for certain Admin API
requests such as innocuous requests to the /status
endpoint for
health checking or to ignore requests for a given path prefix (e.g. a given
Workspace). To this end, the audit_log_ignore_methods
and
audit_log_ignore_paths
configuration options are presented:
audit_log_ignore_methods = GET,OPTIONS
# do not generate an audit log entry for GET or OPTIONS HTTP requests
audit_log_ignore_paths = /foo,/status,^/services,/routes$,/one/.+/two,/upstreams/
# do not generate an audit log entry for requests that match the above regular expressions
The values of audit_log_ignore_paths
are matched via a Perl-compatible regular expression.
For example, when audit_log_ignore_paths = /foo,/status,^/services,/routes$,/one/.+/two,/upstreams/
, the following request paths do not generate an audit-log entry in the database:
/status
/status/
/foo
/foo/
/services
/services/example/
/one/services/two
/one/test/two
/routes
/plugins/routes
/one/routes/two
/upstreams/
bad400request
The following request paths generate an audit log entry in the database:
/example/services
/routes/plugins
/one/two
/routes/
/upstreams
Audit Log Retention
Request audit records are kept in the database for a duration defined by the
audit_log_record_ttl
Kong configuration property.
Records in the database older than audit_log_record_ttl
seconds are automatically
purged. In Cassandra databases, record deletion is handled automatically via the
Cassandra TTL mechanism. In PostgreSQL databases, records are purged via the stored
procedure that is executed on insert into the record database. Thus, request
audit records may exist in the database longer than the configured TTL, if no new
records are inserted to the audit table following the expiration timestamp.
Database Audits
Generating and Viewing Audit Logs
In addition to Admin API request data, Kong will generate granular audit log entries for all insertions, updates, and deletions to the cluster database. Database update audit logs are also associated with Admin API request unique IDs. Consider the following request to create a Consumer:
http :8001/consumers username=bob
HTTP/1.1 201 Created
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Date: Tue, 13 Nov 2018 17:50:18 GMT
Server: kong/0.34-enterprise-edition
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
X-Kong-Admin-Request-ID: 59fpTWlpUtHJ0qnAWBzQRHRDv7i5DwK2
{
"created_at": 1542131418000,
"id": "16787ed7-d805-434a-9cec-5e5a3e5c9e4f",
"type": 0,
"username": "bob"
}
As seen before, a request audit log is generated with details about the request.
Note the presence of the payload
field, recorded when the request body is
present:
http :8001/audit/requests
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Date: Tue, 13 Nov 2018 17:52:41 GMT
Server: kong/0.34-dev-enterprise-edition
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
X-Kong-Admin-Request-ID: SpPaxLTkDNndzKaYiWuZl3xrxDUIiGRR
{
"data": [
{
"client_ip": "127.0.0.1",
"method": "POST",
"path": "/consumers",
"payload": "{\"username\": \"bob\"}",
"request_id": "59fpTWlpUtHJ0qnAWBzQRHRDv7i5DwK2",
"request_timestamp": 1581617463,
"signature": null,
"status": 201,
"ttl": 2591995,
"workspace": "fd51ce6e-59c0-4b6b-b991-aa708a9ff4d2"
}
],
"total": 1
}
Additionally, audit logs are generated to track the creation of the database entity:
http :8001/audit/objects
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
Connection: keep-alive
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Date: Tue, 13 Nov 2018 17:53:27 GMT
Server: kong/0.34-dev-enterprise-edition
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
X-Kong-Admin-Request-ID: ZKra3QT0d3eJKl96jOUXYueLumo0ck8c
{
"data": [
{
"dao_name": "consumers",
"entity": "{\"created_at\":1542131418000,\"id\":\"16787ed7-d805-434a-9cec-5e5a3e5c9e4f\",\"username\":\"bob\",\"type\":0}",
"entity_key": "16787ed7-d805-434a-9cec-5e5a3e5c9e4f",
"expire": 1544723418009,
"id": "7ebabee7-2b09-445d-bc1f-2092c4ddc4be",
"operation": "create",
"request_id": "59fpTWlpUtHJ0qnAWBzQRHRDv7i5DwK2",
"request_timestamp": 1581617463,
},
],
"total": 1
}
Object audit entries contain information about the entity updated, including the
entity body itself, its database primary key, and the type of operation
performed (create
, update
, or delete
). Note also the associated
request_id
field.
Limiting Audit Log Generation
As with request audit logs, it may be desirable to skip generation of audit logs
for certain database tables. This is configurable via the
audit_log_ignore_tables
Kong config option:
audit_log_ignore_tables = consumers
# do not generate database audit logs for changes to the consumers table
Audit Log Retention
Database audit records are kept in the database for a duration defined by the
audit_log_record_ttl
Kong configuration property.
Records in the database older than audit_log_record_ttl
seconds are automatically
purged. In Cassandra databases, record deletion is handled automatically via the
Cassandra TTL mechanism. In PostgreSQL databases, records are purged via the stored
procedure that is executed on insert into the record database. Thus, database
audit records may exist in the database longer than the configured TTL, if no new
records are inserted to the audit table following the expiration timestamp.
Digital Signatures
To provide non-repudiation, audit logs may be signed with a private RSA key. When enabled, a lexically sorted representation of each audit log entry is signed by the defined private key; the signature is stored in an additional field within the record itself. The public key should be stored elsewhere and can be used later to validate the signature of the record.
Setting Up Log Signing
Generate a private key via the openssl
tool:
openssl genrsa -out private.pem 2048
Extract the public key for future audit verification:
openssl rsa -in private.pem -outform PEM -pubout -out public.pem
Configure Kong to sign audit log records:
audit_log_signing_key = /path/to/private.pem
Audit log entries will now contain a field signature
:
{
"client_ip": "127.0.0.1",
"method": "GET",
"path": "/status",
"payload": null,
"request_id": "Ka2GeB13RkRIbMwBHw0xqe2EEfY0uZG0",
"request_timestamp": 1581617463,
"signature": "l2LWYaRIHfXglFa5ehFc2j9ijfERazxisKVtJnYa+QUz2ckcytxfOLuA4VKEWHgY7cCLdn5C7uRJzE6es5V2SoOV59NOpskkr5lTt9kzao64UEw5UNOdeZYZKwyhG9Ge7IsxTK6haW0iG3a9dHqlKlwvnHZTbFM8TUV/umg8sJ1QJ/5ivXecbyHYtD5luKAI6oEgIdZPtQexRkwxlzvfR8lzeC/dDc2slSrjWRbBxNFlgfRKhDdVzVzgu8pEucgKggu67PKLkJ+bQEkxX1+Yg3czIpJyC3t6cgoggb0UNtBq1uUpswe0wdueKh6G5Gzz6XrmOjlv7zSz4gtVyEHZgg==",
"status": 200,
"ttl": 2591995,
"workspace": "fd51ce6e-59c0-4b6b-b991-aa708a9ff4d2"
}
Validating Signatures
To verify record signatures, use the openssl
utility, or other cryptographic
tools that are capable of validating RSA digital signatures.
Signatures are generated using a 256-bit SHA digest. The following example demonstrates how to verify the audit log record shown above. First, store the record signature on disk after stripping the Base64 encoding:
cat <<EOF | base64 -d > record_signature
> l2LWYaRIHfXglFa5ehFc2j9ijfERazxisKVtJnYa+QUz2ckcytxfOLuA4VKEWHgY7cCLdn5C7uRJzE6es5V2SoOV59NOpskkr5lTt9kzao64UEw5UNOdeZYZKwyhG9Ge7IsxTK6haW0iG3a9dHqlKlwvnHZTbFM8TUV/umg8sJ1QJ/5ivXecbyHYtD5luKAI6oEgIdZPtQexRkwxlzvfR8lzeC/dDc2slSrjWRbBxNFlgfRKhDdVzVzgu8pEucgKggu67PKLkJ+bQEkxX1+Yg3czIpJyC3t6cgoggb0UNtBq1uUpswe0wdueKh6G5Gzz6XrmOjlv7zSz4gtVyEHZgg==
> EOF
Next, the audit record must be transformed into its canonical format used for
signature generation. This transformation requires serializing the record into
a string format that can be verified. The format is a lexically-sorted,
pipe-delimited string of each audit log record part, without the signature
,
ttl
, or expire
fields. The following is a canonical
implementation written in Lua:
local cjson = require "cjson"
local pl_sort = require "pl.tablex".sort
local function serialize(data)
local p = {}
data.signature = nil
data.expire = nil
data.ttl = nil
for k, v in pl_sort(data) do
if type(v) == "table" then
p[#p + 1] = serialize(v)
elseif v ~= cjson.null then
p[#p + 1] = v
end
end
return p
end
table.concat(serialize(data), "|")
For example, the canonical format of the audit record above is:
cat canonical_record.txt
127.0.0.1|1544724298663|GET|/status|Ka2GeB13RkRIbMwBHw0xqe2EEfY0uZG0|1542132298664|200|fd51ce6e-59c0-4b6b-b991-aa708a9ff4d2
Ensure that the contents of the canonical record file on disk match the expected canonical record format exactly. The presence of any additional bytes, such as a trailing newline
\n
, will cause a validation failure in the next step.
Once these two elements are in place, the signature can be verified:
openssl dgst -sha256 -verify public.pem -signature record_signature canonical_record.txt
Verified OK
Reference
API Reference
List Request Audit Logs
Endpoint
Response
HTTP 200 OK
{
"data": [
{
"client_ip": "127.0.0.1",
"method": "GET",
"path": "/status",
"payload": null,
"request_id": "ZuUfPfnxNn7D2OTU6Xi4zCnQkavzMUNM",
"request_timestamp": 1581617463,
"signature": null,
"status": 200,
"ttl": 2591995,
"workspace": "0da4afe7-44ad-4e81-a953-5d2923ce68ae"
}
],
"total": 1
}
List Database Audit Logs
Endpoint
Response
HTTP 200 OK
{
"data": [
{
"dao_name": "consumers",
"entity": "{\"created_at\":1542131418000,\"id\":\"16787ed7-d805-434a-9cec-5e5a3e5c9e4f\",\"username\":\"bob\",\"type\":0}",
"entity_key": "16787ed7-d805-434a-9cec-5e5a3e5c9e4f",
"expire": 1544723418009,
"id": "7ebabee7-2b09-445d-bc1f-2092c4ddc4be",
"operation": "create",
"request_id": "59fpTWlpUtHJ0qnAWBzQRHRDv7i5DwK2"
},
],
"total": 1
}
Configuration Reference
See the Data & Admin Audit section of the Configuration Property Reference.