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Authentication with the API server
Kong Mesh exposes API server on ports 5681
and 5682
(protected by TLS).
An authenticated user can be authorized to execute administrative actions such as
- Managing administrative resources like Kong Mesh Secrets on Universal
- Generating user token, data plane proxy token, zone ingress token, zone token
User token
A user token is a signed JWT token that contains
- The name of the user
- The list of groups that a user belongs to
- Expiration date of the token
Groups
A user can be a part of many groups. Kong Mesh adds two groups to a user automatically:
- authenticated users are a part of
mesh-system:authenticated
. - unauthenticated users are part of
mesh-system:unauthenticated
.
Admin user token
Kong Mesh creates an admin user token on the first start of the control plane.
The admin user token is a user token issued for user mesh-system:admin
that belongs to mesh-system:admin
group.
This group is authorized by default to execute all administrative operations.
Generate user tokens
You can generate user tokens only when you provide the credentials of a user authorized to generate user tokens.
kumactl
configured with admin user token extracted in the preceding section is authorized to do it.
kumactl generate user-token \
--name john \
--group team-a \
--valid-for 24h
or you can use API
curl localhost:5681/tokens/user \
-H'authorization: Bearer eyJhbGc...' \
-H'content-type: application/json' \
--data '{"name": "john","groups": ["team-a"], "validFor": "24h"}'
Explore an example token
You can decode the tokens to validate the signature or explore details.
For example, run:
kumactl generate user-token \
--name john \
--group team-a \
--valid-for 24h
which returns:
eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjEiLCJ0eXAiOiJKV1QifQ.eyJOYW1lIjoiam9obiIsIkdyb3VwcyI6WyJ0ZWFtLWEiXSwiZXhwIjoxNjM2ODExNjc0LCJuYmYiOjE2MzY3MjQ5NzQsImlhdCI6MTYzNjcyNTI3NCwianRpIjoiYmYzZDBiMmUtZDg0MC00Y2I2LWJmN2MtYjkwZjU0MzkxNDY4In0.XsaPcQ5wVzRLs4o1FWywf6kw4r2ceyLGxYO8EbyA0fAxU6BPPRsW71ueD8ZlS4JlD4UrVtQQ7LG-z_nIxlDRAYhx4mmHnSjtqWZIsVS13QRrm41zccZ0SKHYxGvWMW4IkGwUbA0UZOJGno8vbpI6jTGfY9bmof5FpJJAj_sf99jCaI1H_n3n5UxtwKVN7dXXD82r6axj700jgQD-2O8gnejzlTjZkBpPF_lGnlBbd39S34VNwT0UlvRJLmCRdfh5EL24dFt0tyzQqDG2gE1RuGvTV9LOT77ZsjfMP9CITICivF6Z7uqvlOYal10jd5gN0A6w6KSI8CCaDLmVgUHvAw
Paste the token into the UI at jwt.io, or use jwt-cli
tool
kumactl generate user-token --name=john --group=team-a --valid-for=24h | jwt
To verify on jwt.io:
https://jwt.io/#id_token=eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6IjEiLCJ0eXAiOiJKV1QifQ.eyJOYW1lIjoiam9obiIsIkdyb3VwcyI6WyJ0ZWFtLWEiXSwiZXhwIjoxNjM2ODExNjc0LCJuYmYiOjE2MzY3MjQ5NzQsImlhdCI6MTYzNjcyNTI3NCwianRpIjoiYmYzZDBiMmUtZDg0MC00Y2I2LWJmN2MtYjkwZjU0MzkxNDY4In0.XsaPcQ5wVzRLs4o1FWywf6kw4r2ceyLGxYO8EbyA0fAxU6BPPRsW71ueD8ZlS4JlD4UrVtQQ7LG-z_nIxlDRAYhx4mmHnSjtqWZIsVS13QRrm41zccZ0SKHYxGvWMW4IkGwUbA0UZOJGno8vbpI6jTGfY9bmof5FpJJAj_sf99jCaI1H_n3n5UxtwKVN7dXXD82r6axj700jgQD-2O8gnejzlTjZkBpPF_lGnlBbd39S34VNwT0UlvRJLmCRdfh5EL24dFt0tyzQqDG2gE1RuGvTV9LOT77ZsjfMP9CITICivF6Z7uqvlOYal10jd5gN0A6w6KSI8CCaDLmVgUHvAw
✻ Header
{
"alg": "RS256",
"kid": "1",
"typ": "JWT"
}
✻ Payload
{
"Name": "john",
"Groups": [
"team-a"
],
"exp": 1636811674,
"nbf": 1636724974,
"iat": 1636725274,
"jti": "bf3d0b2e-d840-4cb6-bf7c-b90f54391468"
}
Issued At: 1636725274 11/12/2021, 2:54:34 PM
Not Before: 1636724974 11/12/2021, 2:49:34 PM
Expiration Time: 1636811674 11/13/2021, 2:54:34 PM
✻ Signature XsaPcQ5wVzRLs4o1FWywf6kw4r2ceyLGxYO8EbyA0fAxU6BPPRsW71ueD8ZlS4JlD4UrVtQQ7LG-z_nIxlDRAYhx4mmHnSjtqWZIsVS13QRrm41zccZ0SKHYxGvWMW4IkGwUbA0UZOJGno8vbpI6jTGfY9bmof5FpJJAj_sf99jCaI1H_n3n5UxtwKVN7dXXD82r6axj700jgQD-2O8gnejzlTjZkBpPF_lGnlBbd39S34VNwT0UlvRJLmCRdfh5EL24dFt0tyzQqDG2gE1RuGvTV9LOT77ZsjfMP9CITICivF6Z7uqvlOYal10jd5gN0A6w6KSI8CCaDLmVgUHvAw
Token revocation
Kong Mesh doesn’t keep the list of issued tokens. To invalidate the token, you can add it to a revocation list.
Every user token has its own ID. As you saw in the previous section, it’s available in payload under jti
key.
To revoke tokens, specify list of revoked IDs separated by ,
and store it as GlobalSecret
named user-token-revocations
Signing key
A user token is signed by a signing key that’s autogenerated on the first start of the control plane.
The signing key is a 2048-bit RSA key stored as a GlobalSecret
with a name that looks like user-token-signing-key-{serialNumber}
.
Signing key rotation
If the signing key is compromised, you must rotate it including all the tokens that were signed by it.
-
Generate a new signing key
Make sure to generate the new signing key with a serial number greater than the serial number of the current signing key.
-
Regenerate user tokens
Create new user tokens. Tokens are always signed by the signing key with the highest serial number. Starting from now, tokens signed by either new or old signing key are valid.
-
Remove the old signing key
All new requests to the control plane now require tokens signed with the new signing key.
Disabling bootstrap of the admin user token
You can remove the default admin user token from the storage and prevent it from being recreated. Keep in mind that even if you remove the admin user token, the signing key is still present. A malicious actor that acquires the signing key, can generate an admin token.
Offline token issuing
In addition to the regular flow of generating signing keys, storing them in secret, and using them to sign tokens on the control plane, Kuma also offers offline signing of tokens. In this flow, you can generate a pair of public and private keys and configure the control plane only with public keys for token verification. You can generate all the tokens without running the control plane.
The advantages of this mode are:
- easier, more reproducible deployments of the control plane, and more in line with GitOps.
- potentially more secure setup, because the control plane does not have access to the private keys.
Here’s how to use offline issuing
-
Generate a pair of signing keys
The following commands generate standard RSA key of 2048 bits and outputs it in PEM-encoded format. You can use any external tool to generate a pair of keys.
kumactl generate signing-key --format=pem > /tmp/key-private.pem kumactl generate public-key --signing-key-path=/tmp/key-private.pem > /tmp/key-public.pem
The result should be similar to this output
cat /tmp/key-private.pem /tmp/key-public.pem -----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY----- MIIEpAIBAAKCAQEAsS61a79gC4mkr2Ltwi09ajakLyUR8YTkJWzZE805EtTkEn/r ... htKtzsYA7yGlt364IuDybrP+PlPMSK9cQAmWRRZIcBNsKOODkAgKFA== -----END RSA PRIVATE KEY----- -----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY----- MIIBCgKCAQEAsS61a79gC4mkr2Ltwi09ajakLyUR8YTkJWzZE805EtTkEn/rL2u/ ... se7sx2Pt/NPbWFFTMGVFm3A1ueTUoorW+wIDAQAB -----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
-
Configure the control plane with public key
Configure a control plane with the following settings
apiServer: authn: type: tokens tokens: enableIssuer: false # disable control plane token issuer that uses secrets validator: useSecrets: false # do not use signing key stored in secrets to validate the token publicKeys: - kid: "key-1" key: | -----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY----- MIIBCgKCAQEAsS61a79gC4mkr2Ltwi09ajakLyUR8YTkJWzZE805EtTkEn/rL2u/ ... se7sx2Pt/NPbWFFTMGVFm3A1ueTUoorW+wIDAQAB -----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----
-
Use the private key to issue tokens offline
The command is the same as with online signing, but with two additional arguments:
-
--kid
- ID of the key that should be used to validate the token. This should matchkid
specified in the control plane configuration. -
--signing-key-path
- path to a PEM-encoded private key.
kumactl generate user-token \ --name john.doe@example.com \ --group users \ --valid-for 24h \ --signing-key-path /tmp/key-private.pem \ --kid key-1
You can also use any external system that can issue JWT tokens using
RS256
signing method with the following claims:-
Name
(string) - the name of the user -
Groups
([]string) - list of user groups
-
Migration
You can use both offline and online issuing by keeping apiServer.authn.tokens.enableIssuer
to true.
You can use both secrets and public key static config validators by keeping apiServer.authn.tokens.validator.useSecrets
to true.
Management
Token revocation works the same when using both online and offline issuing.
Signing key rotation works similarly:
- generate another pair of signing keys
- configure a control plane with old and new public keys
- regenerate tokens for all existing users with the new private key
- remove the old public key from the configuration
Admin client certificates
This section describes the alternative way of authenticating to API Server.
Admin client certificates are deprecated. If you are using it, please migrate to the user token in preceding section.
To use admin client certificates, set KUMA_API_SERVER_AUTHN_TYPE
to adminClientCerts
.
All users that provide client certificate are authenticated as a user with the name mesh-system:admin
that belongs to group mesh-system:admin
.
Usage
- Generate client certificates by using kumactl
kumactl generate tls-certificate --type=client \ --cert-file=/tmp/tls.crt \ --key-file=/tmp/tls.key
-
Configure the control plane with client certificates
- Configure
kumactl
with valid client certificatekumactl config control-planes add \ --name=<NAME> --address=https://<KUMA_CP_DNS_NAME>:5682 \ --client-cert-file=/tmp/tls.crt \ --client-key-file=/tmp/tls.key \ --ca-cert-file=/tmp/ca.crt
If you want to skip CP verification, use
--skip-verify
instead of--ca-cert-file
.
Multizone
In a multizone setup, users execute a majority of actions on the global control plane. However, some actions like generating dataplane tokens are available on the zone control plane. The global control plane doesn’t propagate authentication credentials to the zone control plane. You can set up consistent user tokens across the whole setup by manually copying signing key from global to zone control planes.